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Section 707(b) Standing for Parties in
Interest - Who Cares?
by
Laura B. Bartell*
Much attention has focused on the "means testing"' provisions of Bank-
ruptcy Code § 707(b)(2)2 aimed at preventing consumer abuse of chapter 7
by debtors who could make a meaningful repayment of their debts in a chap-
ter 13 case.3 But less attention has focused on the particular provisions that
granted expanded standing to bring a § 707(b) motion to dismiss. For the
first time, the 2005 amendments gave all parties in interest (as opposed to
only the court and the United States trustee) the ability to move for dismis-
sal based on abuse.4 This article examines how those amendments came
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to Beth Applebaum for her
assistance on this article.
'See, e.g., Luke Welmerink, Cleaning the Mess of the Means Test: The Need for a Case-by-Case
Analysis of 401(K) Loans in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 121 (2010);
Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or Rebutting the
Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245 (2009); Ned W. Waxman & Justin
H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means Testing isPresumptive, but "Totality" is Determinative, 45
Hous. L. REV. 901 (2008); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living with the Means Test, 31 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 463 (2007); Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(B), 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 231
(2005).
2These provisions were added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). All future references to "§" or "section" will refer to Title
11, United States Code, unless expressly stated otherwise.
'The court must presume that abuse exists if the chapter 7 debtor's "current monthly income" (as
defined in § 101(10A) of the Code) reduced by certain specified monthly expenses and multiplied by sixty
is not less than certain dollar amounts specified in the legislation. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV
2016). The deductions are described in § 707(b)(2)(AXii)-(iv), which include "the debtor's applicable
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's
actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal
Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides" (§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)), the "debtor's average
monthly payments on account of secured debts" (§ 707(bX2)(A)(iii)), and the "debtor's expenses for pay-
ment of all priority claims" (§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)).
4The term "party in interest" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and there is some inconsistency
between sections of the Code in indicating whether the United States trustee constitutes a "party in
interest." Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(3)(A) ("after providing notice to parties in interest (including the
United States trustee)") with 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) ("notice to the parties in interest and the United
States Trustee"). When a section of the Code uses the term "party in interest" without mentioning the
United States trustee, it is left to the courts to decide whether the United States trustee should be
considered a party in interest for purposes of that provision. See, e.g., In re South Beach Securities, 606
F.3d 366 (7th Cit. 2010) (holding U.S. trustee is a party in interest entitled to oppose plan of reorganiza-
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about, and whether expanded standing has resulted in a meaningful new
check on chapter 7 abuse. In Part I, I trace the legislative history of these
amendments. In Part II, I look at how many creditors have brought motions
to dismiss, the grounds asserted for dismissal, the types of creditors bringing
the motions, and how the courts have ruled on their motions. In Part III, I
set forth my views on why creditors do and do not seek dismissal and make
further observations about the types of creditors who file motions to dismiss
and where they file them. In the conclusion, I discuss the overall impact of
the expanded standing provisions.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE PATH TO EXPANDED STANDING
The Bankruptcy Code has always permitted the bankruptcy judge to dis-
miss chapter 7 cases under certain circumstances. In the original Bankruptcy
Code of 1978, Congress provided that any party in interest could bring a
motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case and the bankruptcy court could grant it
but "only for cause, including - (1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is
prejudicial to creditors; and (2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required
under chapter 123 of title 28."s According to the legislative history of the
provision, the debtor's ability to repay creditors did not constitute "cause" for
dismissal.6 As a result, in the early years of its existence, § 707 was rarely
used in consumer cases, and when it was, it was almost always invoked by
the debtor seeking to dismiss his or her own case.7 When creditors or the
tion under § 1129(d)); A-1 Trash Pickup, Inc. v. U.S. Trustee (In re A-I Trash Pickup, Inc.), 802 F.2d 774
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that U.S. trustee is a party in interest for the purpose of moving for conversion or
dismissal of a chapter 11 case under § 1112); Bank of America, N.A. v. Lashinsky (In re Ahl), No. 11-2282,
2012 WL 1599834 (D. Ariz. May 7, 2012) (holding U.S. trustee is a party in interest for purposes of
objecting to proofs of claim under § 502(a)). Because the amendments to § 707(bX1) use the phrase "on a
motion by the United States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any party in inter-
est," I use the term "party in interest" in this article to exclude the United States trustee and bankruptcy
administrator.
'Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 707, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606 (1978). Comparable provisions permitting dismissal
of chapter 11 and chapter 13 cases "for cause" were also included. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b)(1) and
1307(c).
6H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 380 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 94 (1978), as reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.
7See, e.g., In re Green, 49 B.R. 7 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); In re Klein, 39 B.R. 530 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984); In re Banks, 35 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983); In re Jennings, 31 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983);
In re Martin, 30 B.R. 24 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983); In re Bryant, 28 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983); In re
Carroll, 24 B.R. 83 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Pagnotta, 22 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); In re Ross,
21 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Waldrep, 20 B.R. 248 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982); In re Kimball, 19
B.R. 300 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re Kapsos, 18 B.R. 88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re St. Laurent, 17 B.R.
768 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re Every, 17 B.R. 685 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Poirier, 16 B.R. 691
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); In re Shell, 14 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981); In re Wolfe, 12 B.R. 686 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Underwood, 7 B.R. 936 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981); In re Loupassi, No. 80-00361,
1981 WL 405082 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 1981); In re Jackson, 7 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); In
re Gallman, 6 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Waldman, S B.R. 401 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re
242 (Vol. 93
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trustee brought a motion to dismiss under § 707 in consumer cases, they
invariably were unsuccessful."
In the following sections, I discuss the legislative history of § 707(b) from
its enactment in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984,9 its initial amendment in 1986 to expand standing to bring a motion to
dismiss, and its subsequent amendment by the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 which
expanded standing and changed the standard for dismissal.
A. THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
Creditors had long hoped for the inclusion in the Bankruptcy Code of a
provision that would force a consumer debtor out of chapter 7 and into a
repayment plan under chapter 13 if the debtor had the ability to pay his or
her debts.10 For several years, bills were introduced in both the House and
the Senate to amend the Bankruptcy Code to deny access to chapter 7 to
debtors who had the means to pay their creditors in chapter 13.511 These
efforts were unsuccessful until Representative Rodino submitted H.R. 5174
in March 1984.12 His bill proposed to amend §707 to insert a new clause (b)
that would read as follows:
(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion
and not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest,
may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this
Reynolds, 4 BR. 703 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980); In re Wirick, 3 BR. 539 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re
Blackmon, 3 B.R. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
'See In re Brighty, 35 B.R 274 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Lang, 5 B.R. 371 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980);
In re Way, 2 B.R. 372 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). Of course, if the court acted sua sponte, the case was
dismissed. See In re Khan, 35 BR. 718 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
9Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312(2), 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
"oEven before enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, three bills, HR. 292, 89th Cong. (1965), H.R. 1057,
90th Cong. (1967), and H.R. 5771, 90th Cong. (1967) were proposed to amend section 55(b) of the
Bankruptcy Act. These bills would have required the judge or referee at the first meeting of creditors to
determine whether the debtor had shown that "adequate relief cannot be obtained under chapter XIII of
this title" whenever the debtor was a "wage earner." See Wage Earner Plans Under the Bankruptcy Act,
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on theJudiciary, 90th Cong. 9, 134 (1967). If the debtor
could not make that showing, the bills required the judge or referee to dismiss the petition unless the
debtor amended it to bring it under chapter XIII. Id. Congressional hearings were held on the two later
bills, see id., but the bills did not emerge from the Committee, perhaps due to the objections of the Bank-
ruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the National Bankruptcy
Conference (represented by Professor Vern Countryman). See id. at 9, 136. Subsequent efforts to amend
the Bankruptcy Act to provide for compulsory chapter 13 are described in the testimony of Frank R.
Kennedy to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Bankuptcy Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 333 and S.
445 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 339-341 (1983).
"See, e.g., S. 2000, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 7294, 97th Cong. (1982);
H.R. 7349, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 7294, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 7349, 97th Cong. (1982); S. 445, 98th
Cong. (1983); H.R. 1800, 98th Cong. (1983).
12H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1984).
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chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds
that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the
provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in
favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.'3
Although originally referred to the House Judiciary Committee, the Com-
mittee was later discharged and the bill came back to the floor for debate. It
passed by voice vote on March 21, 1984.14 The Senate made amendments to
the bill and then passed it as amended.'5 Senator Metzenbaum made the only
recorded comment in the Senate. He praised the elimination of any eligibility
language for chapter 7 based on future income:
I also am extremely pleased that this bill prohibits creditors
from filing motions attempting to deny bankruptcy relief to
individuals because of substantial abuse. If a creditor asks a
court to dismiss a case claiming that there has been substan-
tial abuse of the [bankruptcy laws by the debtor,] the court
would not be ... allowed to do so. Only a bankruptcy court,
acting on its own initiative, could dismiss a case involving
substantial abuse. This will preclude creditors from making
bankruptcy too expensive for the debtor by filing harassing
motions alleging substantial abuse.16
A conference was held on the bill, and the conferees produced a report17
that was later approved by both the House and Senate.'8 The conference
suggested no further changes to the new § 707(b).19 The bill, known as the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, became law on
July 10, 1984.20
B. FIRST EXPANSION OF STANDING IN 1986
Unsurprisingly, following the enactment of § 707(b) there were only a
handful of instances in which the court on its own motion challenged the
debtor's ability to remain in chapter 7 based on substantial abuse. Between
October 8, 1984 (the effective date of the new law adding § 707(b))21 and
November 27, 1986 (the effective date of the 1986 amendments to § 707(b)
3Id. § 212.
14130 CONG. REc. H1853-4 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984).
's130 CONG. REC. S7625 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
16130 CONG. REC. S7624-25 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
17H.R. REP. No. 98-882, 98th Cong. (1984) (Conf. Rep.).
18130 CONG. REc. H7499-50 (daily ed. June 29, 1984); 130 CONG. REC. S8900 (daily ed. June 29,
1984).
"The amendment was in § 312(2) of the bill.
20Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
2 ld. § 552(a).
(Vol. 93244
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described below),2 2 the court ordered the debtor to show cause why his or
her chapter case should not be dismissed under the new § 707(b) in only
twenty-eight reported decisions, nine of which were entered in the District
of North Dakota.2 3 In only thirteen of those decisions (four in the District of
North Dakota) did the bankruptcy judge dismiss the case.24 Two of those
dismissals were reversed on appeal, both on the basis that the debtor did not
have primarily consumer debts.25
Despite the low volume of challenges, Congress did not revisit § 707(b)
until it was considering a more extensive revision of the Code in 1985 and
1986. At that time, three different constituencies were proposing amend-
ments to the Code. First, some bill sponsors wished to provide for additional
bankruptcy judges to address an increased volume of bankruptcy cases.26 A
second group sought to create a new chapter in the Bankruptcy Code to deal
with the financial problems of family farmers.27 And a third group sought to
expand the appointment of United States trustees to serve in bankruptcy
22Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(a), 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
23In re Webb, 75 B.R. 264 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Peluso, 72 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987);
In re Bennett, No. 86-05127, 1986 WL 713372 (Bankr., D.N.D. Mar. 20, 1986); In re Amundson, No. 85-
05620, 1986 WL 713511 (Bankr. D.N.D. Feb. 26, 1986); In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D. Mo. 1986);
In re Cord, 68 B.R. 5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986); In re Deaton, 65 B.R. 663 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); In re
Hudson, 64 B.R. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Horton, No. 86-05280, 1986 WL 713368 (Bankr.
D.N.D. May 29, 1986); In re Gaukler, 63 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); In re Love, 61 B.R. 558 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Keniston, 60 B.R. 742 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986), motion denied, 85 B.R. 202 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1988); In re Hettich, No. 85-05752, 1986 WL 713512 (Bankr. D.N.D. Jan. 27, 1986); In re Kelly,
57 B.R. 536 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986); In re Tibbitts, No. 85-05778, 1986 WL 713515 (Bankr. D.N.D. Jan.
17, 1986); In re Bell, 56 B.R. 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Shands, 63 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1985); In re Kress, 57 B.R. 874 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); In re Hamze, 57 B.R. 37 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In
re Mastroeni, 56 B.R. 456 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Almendinger, 56 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985);
In re Grant, 51 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Edwards, 50 B.R. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In
re Larson, No. 85-05583, 1985 WL 660510 (Bankr. D.N.D. Nov. 22, 1985); In re White, 49 B.R. 869
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985); In re Adams, No. 85-05554, 1985 WL 660467 (Bankr. D.N.D. Nov. 20, 1985); In
re Wright, 48 B.R. 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984). See In
re Jones, 60 B.R. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); In re Christian, 63 B.R. 71 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986) and 51 B.R.
118 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); cf. In re Campbell, 63 B.R. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (court concluded that
matter could not come before the court on suggestion of a creditor, but court determined that there was
no substantial abuse on the merits).
2 4See Webb, 75 B.R. 264; Peluso, 72 B.R. 732; Bruno, 68 B.R. 101; Cord, 68 B.R. 5; Hudson, 64 B.R. 73;
Hettich, No. 85-05752, 1986 WL 713512; Kelly, 57 B.R. 536; Tibbitts, No. 85-05778, 1986 WL 713515;
Shands, 63 B.R. 121; Kress, 57 B.R. 874; Adams, No. 85-05554, 1985 WL 660467; Grant, 51 B.R. 385;
Bryant, 47 B.R. 21. In most cases in which the court declined to dismiss the case, the court found no
substantial abuse, but in a few cases the court concluded that the debtor's debts were not primarily
consumer debts. See Almendinger, 56 B.R. 97; Larson, No. 85-05583, 1985 WL 660510; White, 49 B.R.
869.
25See In re Kelly, 70 B.R. 109 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1986); In re Bell, 65 B.R. 575 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
26See H.R. 4128, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 4140, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 5265, 99th Cong. (1986); S.
1923, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 5316, 99th Cong. (1986).
27See H.R. 1397, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 1399, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 2211, 99th Cong. (1986).
2019) 245
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cases in districts throughout the United States.28
H.R. 5316, introduced by Representative Rodino, included both in-
creased bankruptcy judgeships and an expanded United States trustee pro-
gram.29 The bill also proposed an amendment to § 707(b) to permit the
United States trustee to bring a motion to dismiss a consumer debtor chapter
7 case for substantial abuse.30 The bill was reported out of the House Judici-
ary Committee with no changes to the § 707(b) amendment.3' The bill
passed the House by voice vote and, after amendment in the Senate to add
provisions relating to family farmers, went to conference where no further
changes were made to the amendment.32
Several members of Congress spoke in favor of the conference report, and
three specifically addressed the revisions to § 707(b). Representative Fish
stated:
[Section 707(b)] was never intended to prevent a panel trus-
tee or a U.S. trustee from bringing evidence or information
pertaining to "substantial abuse" to the attention of the
court. These individuals, after all, are the most likely per-
sons to be familiar with those types of facts in these cases.
The "party in interest" phrase in section 707(b) was in-
tended to mean creditors - not panel trustees or U.S. trust-
ees. . . . That is why the conferees agreed to include
language in section 707(b) making it clear that the U.S. trus-
tee may move to dismiss based on substantial abuse. Al-
though the U.S. trustee brings the motion under this new
provision, the conferees recognize that panel trustees are in a
unique position to become aware of abuses in the course of
performing statutory duties. Consequently, the conferees
anticipate that frequently panel trustees will appear in sup-
port of motions filed by the U.S. trustees under section
707(b) as amended. It is also my hope that the Executive
Office for U.S. trustees will issue uniform guidelines to U.S.
trustees and panel trustees for identifying cases of substan-
2
8See S. 1961, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 5265, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 5316, 99th Cong. (1986). Prior
to that time, the United States trustee program was an experiment, applicable only to eighteen districts.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 11 U.S.C. § 1501, 92 Stat. 2549, 2652 (1978).
29H.R. 5316, 99th Cong. (1986).
30H.R. 5316, § 216. As amended, § 707(b) would begin, "After notice and a hearing, the court, on its
own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party
in interest . . . ." Id.
"&e Bankruptcy Judges and United States Trustees Act of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-764, § 216
(1986).
"See H.R. REP. No. 99-958 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
(Vol. 93246
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tial abuse and making section 707(b) motions - and for panel
trustees to bring evidence of fraud or abuse to the attention
of the U.S. trustees.3 3
Senator Hatch spoke in favor of the conference report on the floor of the
Senate, saying with respect to the proposed amendment to § 707(b):
I have already indicated my concern over the precise word-
ing of section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Several
courts, primarily in Ohio, have taken the position that the
bankruptcy trustee is technically "a party in interest" and
may not bring evidence of abuse to the attention of the
court. This was not the result we intended to achieve in the
1984 Bankruptcy Act. As a result of this conference bill, the
U.S. trustee will have the opportunity to inform the court of
fraud or abuse. This explicit authority will go a long way
toward improving the current confusion and clarifying the
real intent of the 1984 legislation.34
He later added that he expected "that the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
will take all appropriate steps to facilitate close cooperation between the U.S.
trustee and the panel trustees in these matters" to "ensure the ability of the
U.S. trustee to carry out his statutory responsibilities under section
707(b)."3 5
Even though the proposed amendment only granted additional standing
to the U.S. trustee, Senator Thurmond also viewed the new language of
§ 707(b) as empowering the panel trustee as well:
This provision explicitly allows the U.S. trustee not only to
bring [information relating to substantial abuse] to the
court's attention, but also to allow the U.S. trustee to move
to dismiss the case on the grounds of substantial abuse. Ob-
viously the panel trustee will also be involved in this pro-
cess, since he has important access to information concerning
fraud and abuse. In order to further facilitate our intent and
our goal in this area - protecting the integrity of the process
by ensuring that the court receives all relevant information
from objective sources - we expect the panel trustee to ad-
vise the U.S trustee of all such pertinent information. The
"132 CONG. REc. H9000-H9001 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
34132 CONG. REC. S15092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
's132 CONG. REc. S15093 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
2019) 247
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panel trustee would appear on behalf of any motion filed in
this regard.3 6
The conference report was approved by voice vote in both the House and
Senate and signed into law on October 27, 1986.37
C. FURTHER ExPANSION OF STANDING IN 2005 AMENDMENTS
In expressly permitting the United States trustee to bring motions to
dismiss for substantial abuse, Congress undoubtedly expected that more such
motions would be brought. Such was not the case. Because the amended
§ 707(b) retained the statutory presumption in favor of permitting the con-
sumer debtor to remain in chapter 7, the United States trustees and bank-
ruptcy administrators38 rarely brought such motions.39 When they did file
36
1d.
5 7Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
"Bankruptcy administrators exercise the powers of United States trustee in the districts of Alabama
and North Carolina, including the power to file motions to dismiss under § 707(b). FED. R. BANKR. P.
9035. See In re Jarrell, 189 B.R. 374, 377 n.1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995).
'
9
For the first ten years after the effective date of the 1986 amendments to § 707 to permit the U.S.
trustee to move to dismiss a case for substantial abuse, there were only slightly more than one hundred
reported bankruptcy cases in which a U.S. trustee (or bankruptcy administrator) brought such a motion
and the bankruptcy court ruled on it. See In re Zaleta, 211 B.R. 178 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996); In re
Stewart, 201 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996); In re Duncan, 201 B.R. 889 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996); In re
Matias, 203 B.R. 490 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); In re Oswald, No. 96-70914, 1996 WL 33406627 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1996); In re Mathes, No. 96-32602, 1996 WL 1055813 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 21, 1996);
In re Schmidt, 200 BR. 36 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996); In re Higuera, 199 BR. 196 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996);
In re Haffner, 198 B.R. 646 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re Stallman, 198 BR. 491 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996);
In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996); In re Uddin, 196 B.R. 19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996);
In re Ontiveros, No. 95-82072, 1996 WL 33401160 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996), revd, 198 BR. 284
(C.D. Ill. 1996); In re Dickerson, 193 BR. 67 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Braithwaite, 192 B.R. 882,
motion to amend denied, 197 BR. 834 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In re Vianese, 192 B.R. 61 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Richardson, No. 95-41052, 1995
WL 17005102 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 1995); In re Snow, 185 B.R. 397 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995); In re
Gentri, 185 B.R. 368 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); In -re Hocker, No. 95-20588, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 2181
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 1995); In re Peia, No. 95-19537 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1995), available as
Exhibit F to Appendix A to In re Peia, 204 B.R. 310 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996); In re Dempton, 182 B.R. 38
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); In re Blair, 180 B.R. 656 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Jarrell, 189 B.R. 374
(Bankr. M.D.M.C. 1995); In re Tylasky, No. 94-31061, 1995 WL 1032564 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Mar. 20,
1995); In re Messenger, 178 B.R. 145 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re Smith, No. 94-01953, 1995 WL
20345 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 11, 1995); In re Gavita, 177 B.R. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994); In re Hill, No. 94-
01881, 1994 WL 738663 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 22, 1994); In re Farris, No. 94-40882, 1994 WL 16865633
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 1994); In re Christie, 172 BR. 233 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Ragan, 171
B.R. 592 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Martens, 171 B.R. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Tindall, 184
B.R. 842 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Dominguez, 166 B.R. 66 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1994); In re Wilkinson,
168 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Fessler, 168 B.R. 622 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Faulk-
ner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Morse, 164 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994); In re Lee,
162 B.R. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re Rogers, 168 BR. 806 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993); In re Bacco, 160
BR. 283 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993); In re Buntin, 161 BR. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); In re Bush, No. 93-
10771, 1993 WL 13004595 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 1993); In re McCormack, 159 B.R. 491 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1993); In re Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Barnes, 158 B.R. 105 (Bankr.
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motions, the bankruptcy courts denied them in a significant number of the
cases.40 As was true before the latest amendment, judges themselves rarely
W.D. Tenn. 1993); In re Laury-Norvell, 157 B.R. 14 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Hutton, 158 BR. 648
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993); In re Fitzgerald, 155 BR. 711 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Williams, 155 B.R.
773 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re Smith, 157 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Morris, 153 B.R.
559 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Dickerson, 166 BR. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re Smurthwaite, 149
BR. 409 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1992); In re Rowell, No. 92-50228, 1992 WL 12004006 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
Dec. 16, 1992); In re Butts, 148 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992); In re Shepherd, 147 B.R. 422 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1992); In re Farrell, 150 B.R. 116 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1992); In re Hampton, 147 B.R. 130 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1992); In re Richmond, 144 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992); In re Veenhuis, 143 B.R 887
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1992); In re Traub, 140 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992); In re Nolan, 140 B.R. 797
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In re Wray, 136 B.R. 122 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); In re Beles, 135 B.R. 286 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Goodson, 130 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Oka. 1991); In re Fortune, 130 B.R. 525
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991); In re Baribeau, No. 91-20140, 1991 WL 11767173 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 26, 1991);
In re Elliston, No. 91-50048, 1991 WL 11002685 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 15, 1991); In re Scheinberg, 132
B.R. 443 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991), affd, 134 B.R. 426 (D. Kan. 1992); In re Stratton, 136 B.R. 804 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1991); In re Hammer, 124 BR. 287 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991), vacated sub nom. In re Pilgrim, 135
B.R. 314 (C.D. Ill. 1992); In re Harris, 122 B.R. 744 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990), rev'd, 125 B.R. 254 (D.S.D.
1991), affd, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cit. 1992); In re Dubberke, 119 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); In re
Ritzman, No. 89-11846, 1990 WL 10007463 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. June 7, 1990); In re Helmick, 117 B.R. 187
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Johnson, 115 B.R. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990); In re Vesnesky, 115 BR. 843
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Piontek, 113 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); In re Cook, 110 B.R. 544 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Roth, 108 B.R. 78 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Martin, 107 BR. 247 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1989); In re Wilkes, 114 B.R. 551 (Bankr. S.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Woodhall, 104 B.R. 544 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1989); In re Tefertiller, 104 B.R. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Braley, 103 BR. 758 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 110 B.R. 211 (E.D. Va. 1990); In re Clark, 100 BR- 821 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989),
appeal dismissed, 108 B.R. 566 (W.D. Va. 1989), rev'd, 927 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Gyurci, 95 B.R.
639 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Busbin, 95 B.R. 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Andrus, 94 B.R. 76
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Rushing, 93 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988); In re Wegner, 91 B.R. 854
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In re Gaskins, 85 B.R. 846 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re Strange, 85 BR. 662
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988); In re Goulding, 79 BR. 874 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). See also Huisinga v. Koch
(In re Koch), 187 B.R. 664 (D.S.D. 1995) (affirming unreported bankruptcy decision denying motions to
dismiss), revd, 109 F.3d 1285 (8th Cir. 1997); Fonder v. U.S., 974 F.2d 996 (8th Cit. 1992) (affirming
unreported decision of bankruptcy court granting motion to dismiss for substantial abuse); Green v. Staples
(In re Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cit. 1991) (reversing unreported bankruptcy court decision granting
motion to dismiss for substantial abuse); Heller v. Foulston (In re Heller), 160 B.R. 655 (D. Kan. 1993)
(affirming unreported bankruptcy court decision granting motion to dismiss for substantial abuse); Wilson
v. U.S. Trustee (In re Wilson), 125 B.R. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (affirming unreported bankruptcy court
decision granting motion to dismiss for substantial abuse); In re Herbst, 95 B.R. 98 (W.D. Wis. 1988)
(reversing unreported bankruptcy court decision denying motion to dismiss for substantial abuse).
'In almost one third of the reported cases for the first ten years after the amendment, listed in note 39
supra, the bankruptcy judge denied the motion to dismiss. See Koch, 109 F.3d 1285; Green, 934 F.2d 568;
Herbst, 95 BR. 98; Zaleta, 211 B.R. 178; Higuera, 199 B.R. 196; Ontiveros, No. 95-82072, 1996 WL
33401160; Dickerson, 193 BR. 67; Balaja, 190 B.R. 335; Richardson, No. 95-41052, 1995 WL 17005102;
Gentri, 185 B.R. 368; Hocker, No. 95-20588, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 2181; Messenger, 178 B.R. 145; Hill, No.
94-01881, 1994 WL 738663; Martens, 171 B.R. 43; Fessler, 168 B.R. 622; Marshalek, 158 BR. 704;
Laury-Norvell, 157 B.R. 14; Williams, 155 BR. 773; Rowell, No. 92-50228, 1992 WL 12004006; Butts,
148 B.R. 878; Shepherd, 147 B.R. 422; Farrell, 150 B.R. 116; Beles, 135 B.R. 286; Fortune, 130 B.R. 525;
Hammer, 124 B.R. 287; Harris, 122 B.R. 744; Martin, 107 B.R. 247; Wilkes, 114 B.R. 551; Tefertiller, 104
B.R 513; Braley, 103 B.R. 758; Clark, 100 B.R. 821; Wegner, 91 B.R. 854; Goulding, 79 BR. 874. Some of
those decisions were reversed on appeal. See Koch, 109 F.3d 1285; Clark; 927 F.2d 793; Hammer, 135
B.R. 314; Herbst, 95 B.R. 98; Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284; Harris, 125 B.R. 254.
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sought dismissal under § 707(b),41 and often declined to dismiss even when
they had filed a sua sponte motion.42
The issue of alleged consumer abuse of chapter 7 did not resurface again
until the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, established pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,43 issued its report on the operation of
the Bankruptcy Code in 1997.44 Over the objection of four dissenting com-
missioners, the report included no suggestions to curb abuse by consumer
debtors, such as a mechanism for determining whether debtors had the re-
sources to fund a chapter 13 plan (so-called "means testing" provisions).45
But dissenting commissioners James I. Shepard and the Honorable Edith H.
Jones recommended various approaches for implementing a means test, in-
cluding eligibility tests that would preclude debtors with certain incomes
from filing for chapter 7, or an amendment to § 707(b) to 'require that the
court dismiss or convert the case of a debtor who has filed for Chapter 7 if,
on the motion of a party in interest or the U.S. Trustee, it is found that the
debtor has the ability to repay a portion of his debts in Chapter 13."46
Apart from the general means testing suggestions, the dissenting commis-
sioners specifically proposed that § 707(b) be amended "to provide procedur-
ally that . . . motions to dismiss for inappropriate use of Chapter 7 may be
brought by creditors and panel trustees, as well as U.S. Trustees and the
court."4 7 As they explained:
41See In re Sanseverino, 171 BR. 46 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Tudor, No. 94-50025, 1994 WL
16001758 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 1994); In re Martinez, 171 B.R 264 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re
Boyd, 143 B.R 237 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Berndt, 127 B.R. 222 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1991); In re Cronk,
124 B.R. 759 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Palmer, 117 BR. 443 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990); In re Higginbot-
ham, 111 B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Byrne, No. 89-71610, 1989 WL 268880 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. Nov. 13, 1989); In re Brady, 95 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd, 86 BR. 616 (W.D. Mo.
1987); In re Penna, 86 BR. 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); In re Strong, 84 B.R. 541 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988);
In re War-field, 80 BR. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Krohn, 78 BR. 829 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In
re Martin, No. 87-05878, 1987 WL 857313 (Bankr. D.N.D. Nov. 13, 1987); In re Day, 77 BR. 225 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1987); In re Antal, 74 B.R. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), vacated on reconsideration, 85 BR. 838
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Struggs, 71 BR. 96 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Renner, 70 B.R. 27
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Newsom, 69 BR. 801 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
4 2
The court dismissed pursuant to § 707(b) in Sanseverino, 171 BR. 46; Tudor, No. 94-50025, 1994
WL 16001758; Boyd, 143 BR. 237; Berndt, 127 B.R. 222; Palmer, 117 BR. 443; Byrne, No. 89-71610,
1989 WL 268880; Brady, 95 B.R. 1004 (rev'd on appeal); Strong, 84 B.R. 541; Krohn, 78 B.R. 829; Martin,
No. 87-05878, 1987 WL 857313; Day, 77 B.R. 225; Antal, 74 BR. 8 (vacated on reconsideration); Struggs,
71 B.R. 96; Newsom, 69 B.R. 801.
43Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1984).
44See REPORT OF THE NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
(Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT].
43
See Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners,
REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, Vol. I, ch. 5, at 3.
46
Hon. Edith H. Jones & Commissioner James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, Vol. I, ch. 5, at 16.
47
Id. at 36. They also proposed: (1) eliminating the requirement that the debtor must have primarily
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The current restrictions on standing to bring a motion under
this section should be relaxed. Creditors and panel trustees
should be allowed to participate in the policing of the bank-
ruptcy system to prevent the sorts of abuse contemplated by
this provision. They are the parties most likely to uncover
the information necessary to pursue a dismissal on account of
abuse. While U.S. Trustees have stepped into the breach,
their resources and basic knowledge of each individual case
are limited. Courts are ill-suited ethically and information-
ally to initiate § 707(b) actions and should have this respon-
sibility lifted from their shoulders. Because creditors may
make inappropriate use of § 707(b) actions to harass debtors
unfairly, a fee-shifting provision, like that contained in
§ 523(d), should be added to balance the opposing interest
involved.48
The views of the dissenting commissioners prompted the introduction of
a series of bills in both the House49 and Senate,o most of which included
provisions to expand standing under § 707(b) to include all parties in inter-
est.51 One of these bills, H.R. 3150, passed the House52 but, when the Senate
took up the bill, it substituted its own language53 before passage.54  The
Senate bill introduced a new significant restriction on filing motions to dis-
miss. Under a new proposed § 707(b)(5), a party in interest would be pre-
cluded from bringing a motion to dismiss for abuse "if the debtor and the
debtor's spouse combined, as of the date of the order for relief, have current
monthly total income equal to or less than the national median household
monthly income calculated on a monthly basis for a household of equal size."ss
The bill also included several fee shifting provisions. Some were designed
to provide incentives to encourage the trustee to file motions to dismiss or
convert for abuse. The trustee who brought such a motion and prevailed
could recover all reasonable costs for prosecuting the motion (including rea-
consumer debt; (2) removing the presumption in favor of allowing the debtor to remain in chapter 7; and
(3) clarifying the meaning of "substantial abuse." Id. at 36-47.
"Id. at 37-38 (footnote omitted).
49See H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).
sOSee S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997).
51See H.R. 2500 § 115; H.R. 3150 §103; S. 1301 § 102(a)(2XB). The bills differed over whether to
retain the standard of "substantial abuse" or some other standard.
52144 CONG. REc. H4442 (daily ed. June 10, 1988).
'3H.R. 3150 (engrossed version in Senate, Sept. 23, 1998).
s4144 CONG. REc. S10767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998).
"S. REP. No. 105-253, 105th Cong. (1998) (proposed § 707(b)(5)). If the debtor had a household of
more than four individuals, the median income was to be increased over the median income for a household
of four by $583 for each additional member. Id.
2019) 251
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
sonable attorneys' fees) from counsel for the debtor, if debtor was represented
by counsel.56 In addition, the bill included potential sanctions against
debtor's counsel. If the court found the attorney had violated Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 9011, the court would be required to assess a civil penalty against the
attorney, payable to the trustee or the United States trustee.5 7 On the other
hand, if a party in interest (other than a panel trustee) brought a motion to
dismiss and was unsuccessful, the court was allowed (but not required) to
award all reasonable costs in contesting the motion, including reasonable at-
torneys' fees and actual damages not less than $5,000, but only if the court
found that "(i) the position of the party that brought the motion was not
substantially justified; or (ii) the party brought the motion solely for the pur-
pose of coercing a debtor into waiving a right guaranteed to the debtor under
this title."58 No such award could be made against a party in interest with a
claim in an amount less than $1,000.59
Other significant changes to H.R. 3150 emerged from conference. These
included the creation of a presumption of abuse whenever an individual
debtor failed the means test.60 Even if an individual passed the means test,
the debtor's chapter 7 case could be dismissed on either of two additional
grounds added by the conferees: "[whenever] the debtor filed the petition in
bad faith" or "[whenever] the totality of the circumstances . . . of the debtor's
financial situation demonstrates abuse."61 Finally, the conferees inserted an
explicit reference to the "panel trustee" as one of the parties who could bring
a motion to dismiss so that the language of § 707(b)(1) would direct the
court, "on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, panel
trustee or a party in interest," to dismiss for abuse.62 The House passed this
conference report,63 but the Senate failed to act on it before the end of the
legislative session and, therefore, it died.
1 6Id. (proposed § 707(b)(3)(A)).
"Id. (proposed § 707(b)(3)(B)). The attorney who signed a petition on behalf of the debtor was
deemed to certify that the attorney had "performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that
gave rise to the petition and . . . determined that the petition - (I) is well grounded in fact; and (II) is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law and does not constitute an abuse." Id. (proposed § 707(bX3)(C)).
"Id. (proposed § 707(bX4)).
"Id. (proposed § 707(b)(4)(A) and (B).
soThe presumption of abuse would be triggered if the debtor's current monthly income, as defined, less
the sum of monthly expenses, determined using the applicable IRS allowances, monthly payments on
secured debt, and expenses for priority claims, multiplied by sixty, was not less than the lesser of 25% of
the debtor's non-priority unsecured claims or $5,000. See H.R. REP. No. 105-794, at 5 (1998) (Conf.
Rep.).
6 Id. § 102(aX2)(BXii) (proposed § 707(b)(3)).
621d. § 102(aX2)(BXi)(I) (proposed § 707(b)(1)).
63 144 CONG. REC. H10239-40 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998).
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Representative Gekas introduced H.R. 83364 early in the next session,
which proposed language substantially identical to the conference report on
H.R. 3150 from the prior session.65 After a series of hearings on the bill, 66
H.R. 833 emerged from the House Judiciary Committee. Throughout the
hearing process, there were extensive critiques of the general means-testing
provisions,67 but few who testified objected to the expanded standing provi-
sions. One of those who did object to expanded standing, Bankruptcy Judge
Carol J. Kenner of the District of Massachusetts, said that she saw "a danger
in expanding [the standing provision]" because "there is a danger that some
debtors may become embroiled in litigation that they simply can't understand
or defend against."68 Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Law School also
opined that "[a]llowing creditors' motions under 707(b) means that creditors
who have much more money and much more leverage can just squeeze debt-
ors harder."69 Two bankruptcy attorneys testified that, while trustees
should be allowed to bring motions to dismiss, creditors should not.70 On the
other hand, Judith Greenstone Miller, representing the Commercial Law
League of America, objected to the provision precluding creditor standing to
bring motions to dismiss if the debtor was a below-median income debtor.7 '
When H.R. 833 emerged from the House Judiciary Committee, the pro-
posed amendments on means testing had changed dramatically, but those re-
lating to standing had changed in only minor respects.72 The House passed
64H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999).6 Id. at § 102(b)(2)(iii).
'See Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Joint Hearings]; Bankruptcy Refonm Act of 1999 (Part I), Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings Part 1]; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part II), Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, House of 106th Cong.
(1999); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III), Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Ad-
ministrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999).
'See, e.g., Justice Department Comments, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. REP. No. 106-123,
pt. 1, at 204 (1999) (opposing § 102 of the bill).
'Joint Hearings at 80.
69
Joint Hearings at 105.
70
See Hearings Part I at 114-15 (testimony of Ralph R. Mabey, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae);
Hearings Part I at 166 (statement of Leon S. Forman, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley).
71
See Joint Hearings at 94 (prepared statement of Judith Greenstone Miller representing the Commer-
cial Law League of America).
72
1n § 707(b)(1), the Committee shortened the name of the "panel trustee" to "trustee" in the list of
parties permitted to file a motion to dismiss or convert for abuse. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999,
H.R. REP. No. 106-123, Part 1, 106th Cong. (1999), §102(a)(2)(B)(i)(I). The Committee also modified the
fee-shifting inducement provisions, by providing that a successful motion by a panel trustee or bankruptcy
administrator could lead to sanctions, including reimbursement of costs (including reasonable attorneys'
fees), or civil penalties against counsel for the debtor payable to the panel trustee, bankruptcy administra-
tor, or U.S. trustee, but only if the action of counsel in filing the chapter 7 case "violated Rule 9011." Id.
§ 102(a)(2)(B)(ii) (proposed § 707(b)(4)(A)). Sanctions against a party in interest (not including a trustee
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the revised bill on May 5, 199973 and sent it to the Senate. The Senate had
been working on its own bankruptcy reform bill, S. 625, introduced by Sena-
tor Grassley in March.74 The Senate bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which amended it and reported the amended bill to the Senate
on May 11, 1999.75 The Judiciary Committee Report emphasized that:
[U]nder S. 625, creditors and private trustees are now ex-
plicitly given the power to present evidence of abuse to the
bankruptcy judge. Moreover, S. 625 gives trustees impor-
tant new financial incentives for ferreting out bankrupts
who have repayment capacity and provides for appropriate
penalties for bankruptcy attorneys who recklessly steer indi-
viduals with repayment capacity to chapter 7 bankruptcy.
S. 625 contains penalties for creditors who attempt to harass
or intimidate bankrupts by filing, or threatening to file, mo-
tions under section 707(b). Thus, contrary to the assertions
of some, there are real and meaningful reasons why creditors
will not use their right to file 707(b) motions to harass or
coerce debtors.76
With respect to the standing provisions of § 707(b), the amended Senate
bill closely tracked the language in H.R. 3150 previously agreed to by the
House and Senate conferees. The only modifications of substance appeared in
the section precluding anyone other than the judge, the United States trus-
tee, bankruptcy administrator, or panel trustee from bringing a means-testing
motion to dismiss against a below-median debtor. In defining a below-median
income debtor, it also changed the reference from median "household" income
to median "family" income, a change consistent with the similar provision in
H.R. 833.
or United States trustee) for bringing an unsuccessful motion were no longer precluded if the party in
interest had a claim less than $1,000 as in the prior version of the bill. Id. (proposed § 707(b)(5)). The test
for whether the debtor was below-median and, therefore, could not be the subject of a motion to dismiss
by anyone other than the court, the U.S. trustee, or the trustee was modified to refer to median family
income rather than median household income. Id. (proposed § 707(b)(6)).
71145 CONG. REc. H2654 (daily ed. May 5, 1999).
71S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999).
7 5Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 - S. 625, S. REP. No. 106-49, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 106-49]. The Committee did so over the objection of the Office of Legislative Affairs of the
U.S. Department of Justice, which sent a letter to Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Committee, expressing its
objection to the bill. Letter from Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legisla-
tive Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Orrin Hatch (April 9, 1999) (on file with author). Although
the Department of Justice criticized many aspects of the bill, with respect to the expanded standing
provisions it only objected to the increased duties on debtors' counsel and the exclusion of claimants with
claims less than $1,000 from the risk of sanctions for filing an improper motion. Despite these objections,
the Judiciary Committee changed neither provision.
768. REP. No. 106-49, at 8.
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The Senate replaced the text of H.R. 833 with the text of S. 625 and
passed the amended bill.77 However, instead of sending the bill to conference
committee with the House, a series of informal discussions took place be-
tween House and Senate proponents of bankruptcy reform, after which Sena-
tor Grassley introduced a compromise bill, S. 3186.78 In the compromise bill,
§ 707(b)(1) specified that the "trustee" or "bankruptcy administrator" could
bring a motion under § 707(b)(1).79 It also amended the exclusions from the
sanctions provision for small claimants bringing an improper motion to dis-
miss to exclude only a "small business" with a claim aggregating less than
$1,000 (rather than any small claimant) and inserted a definition of "small
business."80 The text of S. 3186 was incorporated into the conference report
on H.R. 2415, an unrelated bill,8 ' with no changes from the language of the
proposed amendments to § 707(b), and the conference report was passed by
both the House82 and Senate.83
However, President Clinton declined to sign the bill within ten days,
during a period when Congress was adjourned, effectively vetoing it.84 Then
Congress failed to enact any law incorporating modifications to § 707(b) dur-
ing the following four years, although several new bills were introduced8 5 and
one made it as far as a conference committee.86
Means-testing reform efforts were not resurrected until 2005. At that
time, Senator Grassley, on behalf of himself and seven other senators, intro-
duced S. 256, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005.87 The proposed amendment to § 707(b)(1) and the sanctions
provisions included in the bill were identical to versions that had previously
passed the House.88 When the bill emerged from the Senate Judiciary Com-
7146 CONG. REc. S255 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2000).
7S. 3186, 106th Cong. (2000).
79Id. § 102(a)(2XB)(i)(I) (proposed § 707(b)(1)).
"Id. § 102(a)(2) (C) (proposed § 707(bX5)(B) & (C)). A "small business" was defined to mean "an
unincorporated business, partnership, corporation, association, or organization that - (I) has fewer than 25
full-time employees as determined on the date on which the motion is filed; and (II) is engaged in commer-
cial or business activity." Id. (proposed § 707(b)(5)(C)(i)). In determining the number of employees for
purposes of this test, "the number of employees of a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation includes the
employees of - (I) a parent corporation; and (II) any other subsidiary corporation of the parent corpora-
tion." Id. (proposed § 707(bX5XCii)).
s"H.R. REP. No. 106-970, 106th Cong. (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
82146 CONG. REc. H9840 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000).
83146 CONG. REc. S11730 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000).
54U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
a5 See H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
5745, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 975, 108th Cong. (2003).
"See H.R. REP. No. 107-617, 107th Cong. (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
7S. 256. 109th Cong. (2005).
"The bill amended prior §707(b) in four respects: (1) it expanded the standing provision to permit
motions to dismiss by parties in interest and trustees or bankruptcy administrators; (2) it permitted the
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mittee and was placed on the calendar of the Senate, the language of these
provisions remained unchanged.89 The Senate passed the amended billV
without making any change to the expanded standing language in § 707(b)(1)
or the sanctions provisions.9' The House Judiciary Committee quickly con-
sidered the bill and recommended no changes to § 707(b).92 Pursuant to H.
Res. 211,9 which did not allow any amendments, the House debated the bill
and passed it on April 14, 2005.94 President George W. Bush signed it into
law on April 20, 2005.95
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CREDITOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
UNDER SECTION 707(B)
The legislative history of the amendments to § 707 demonstrate that ex-
panded standing to permit parties in interest other than the United States
trustee or bankruptcy administrator to bring a motion to dismiss was a cen-
tral goal of those who sought more restricted access to chapter 7 for con-
sumer debtors. I set out to discover whether this expanded standing changed
in any meaningful way the number or nature of motions to dismiss under
§ 707(b) after the 2005 amendments. In this Part of this paper I set out my
methodology, the results of my research, and the limitations of my results.
A. METHODOLOGY
In order to find cases in which parties in interest and not the United
court to convert the chapter 7 case to a chapter 13 or chapter 11 case with the consent of the debtor; (3)
it changed the standard for dismissal from "substantial abuse" to "abuse;" and (4) it deleted the presump-
tion in favor of permitting the debtor to remain in chapter 7. Id. § 102(a). The amended § 707(b)(1) reads
as follows:
(b)(1) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by
the United States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any
party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter
whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or with the debtor's consent, convert
such a case to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting
of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter. In making a determina-
tion whether to dismiss a case under this section, the court may not take into
consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable contribu-
tions (that meet the definition of "charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3)
to any qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as that term is defined
in section 548(d)(4)).
Id. The bill also included the new sanctions provisions of § 707(b)(4) & (5) and barred parties from
bringing motions to dismiss under § 707(b) against below-median debtors in § 707(b)(6). Id.
8'151 CONG. REc. S1729 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2005).
90151 CONG. REc. S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).
91l51 CONG. REc. S2534 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2005).
9 2H.R. REP. No. 109-31, 109th Cong., pt. 1, at 263 (2005).
9 'H. Res. 211, 109th Cong. (2005); see H.R. REP. No. 109-43, 109th Cong. (2005).
" I51 CONG. REc. H2076-77 (daily ed. April 14, 2005).
9 5Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
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States trustee or a bankruptcy administrator had filed a motion to dismiss
under §707(b), I researched all reported cases between the effective date of
the 2005 amendments through the end of 2017 in which §707(b) motions (or
motions to dismiss for bad faith or abuse) had been filed. I also looked for any
references to these types of motions discoverable through a search of chapter
7 dockets on Bloomberg Law (Bankruptcy Court Dockets).96 There were
literally hundreds of cases involving these motions, but almost all of them had
been filed by either the United States trustee or a bankruptcy administrator.
After eliminating those cases,97 I identified only ninety-nine cases in
which a party in interest (not the U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator)
had filed the motion or requested dismissal in an adversary proceeding.98 The
"Bankruptcy court dockets are searchable on Bloomberg Law only to the extent that they have been
updated to include the reference for which one is searching. Therefore, it is quite possible that motions to
dismiss under §707(b) have been filed by creditors in chapter 7 cases in which the decision was not
reported and which do not appear in a docket search. There is no way to determine how many such
motions exist.
9I excluded one case in which a creditor joined a motion previously filed by the U.S. trustee. See In re
Frontera, No. 08-15277 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2009), ECF No. 18. I did include a case in which the
creditor not only "intervened" in a prior motion filed by the U.S. trustee but also filed its own motion. See
In re Lapke, No. 07-81140 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007), ECF Nos. 33, 34.
9"See In re Grillot, No. 16-11262, 2017 WL 6604601 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2017); McInnis v. Phillips (In
re Phillips), 573 B.R. 626 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017); In re Melcher, No. 16-21536, 2017 WL 3981110
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2017); In re Takano, No. 15-00108 (D. Guam Aug. 15, 2017); In re Strongs, 569
B.R. 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017); Dulles Motorcars, Inc. v. Nowell (In re Nowell), No. 16.50672, 2017 WL
1968644 (Bankr. W.D. Va. May 11, 2017); In re Beinhauer, No. 14-74450, 20017 WL 1373254 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2017); James v. West (In re West), No. 16-40358, 2017 WL 746250 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
Feb. 24, 2017); In re Pagan, No. 14-08824, 2017 WL 405611 (Bankr. D.P.R. Jan. 30, 2017); In re Toone,
No. 15-30535 (Bankr. D.NJ. Nov. 28, 2016), ECF No. 72; In re Chovev, 559 B.R. 339 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2016); In re Watts, 557 B.R. 640 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016); In re Norenberg, 554 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mont.
2016); In re Nguyen, No. 15-12413, 2016 WL 3598322 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 27, 2016); Modi v. Virani (In
re Virani), No. 15-61378, 2015 WL 6146029 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2015); In re Miller, No. 13-35116
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015), ECF No. 127, affd sub nom. Miller v. Gilliam (In re Miller), No. 15-1328,
2016 WL 5957270 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2016); In re Bryant, No. 15-00291 (Bankr. D.D.C. Aug. 25,
2015), ECF No. 23; Vaughn v. Williams (In re Williams), No. 14-10838, 2015 WL 4366321 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015); In re Price, No. 14-13186 (Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 31, 2015), ECF No. 64; In re
Hanson, No. 13-73855, 2015 WL 891669 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2015); In re Dini, No. 13-25078
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2015), ECF No. 169; Tal v. Harth (In re Harth), 517 B.R. 385 (B.A.P. 10th Cir
2014); Cousin v. Westbrook (In re Westbrook), No. 13-35191 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2014); In re
Grullon, No. 13-11716, 2014 WL 2109924 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2014); AFF Ohio, LLC v. Jelinger
(In re Jelinger), No. 12-30949 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2014), ECF No. 42; In re Gutierrez, 528 B.R. 1
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2014); In re Vorel, No. 13-30747, 2014 WL 1089281 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2014); In re
Cherrett, No. 13-24792 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014), ECF No. 47, affd sub nom. Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Cherrett (In re Cherrett), 523 B.R. 660 (B-A.P. 9th Cir. 2014); Valdes v. Casey (In re Casey), No. 11-
12394, 2013 WL 6730966 (Bankr. Dec. 10, 2013); In re Ellis, 499 B.R. 498 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2013); In re
Martin, No. 12-38024, 2013 WL 5423954 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2013); In re Campbell, No. 12-
28569 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 20, 2013), ECF No. 39; In re Wilcox, No. 13-70516, 2013 WL 4787959
(Bankr. W.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2013); In re Evatt, 497 B.R. 483 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2013); In re Bradley, No. 13-
01390, 2013 WL 4663125 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2013) (Richard Bradley); In re Gandy, No. 11-30369,
2013 WL 3712425 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. July 12, 2013), affd sub nom. Schuchardt v. Gandy (In re Gandy),
2015 WL 4431017 (E.D. Tenn. July 20, 2015), affd sub nom. Gandy v. Schuchardt (In re Gandy), 556 B.R.
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343 (6th Cir. 2016); In re Hardigan, 490 B.R. 437 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013); Barragan v. Rosales (In re
Rosales), No. 12-24965, 2013 WL 197449 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 5, 2013); In re Matthews, No. 13-10521,
2013 WL 1385221 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2013); In re Burdett, No. 12-12066, 2013 WL 865575 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. Mar. 7, 2013); In re Citta, No. 10-34162, 2012 WL 6624690 (Bankr. D.NJ. Dec. 19, 2012); In re
Edwards, No. 12-42779 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2012) (Brenda Edwards), ECF No. 48; Hiller v. Hiller
(In re Hiller), 482 BR. 462 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); Eason v. Owens (In re Owens), 483 BR. 262 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2012); In re Bogart, No. 11-190089, 2012 WL 3913093 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 7, 2012); In re
Ajunwa, No. 11-11363, 2012 WL 3820638 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); In re Lusane, No. 11-00889,
2012 WL 3018450 (Bankr. D.D.C. July 24, 2012); In re McFadden, 477 BR. 686 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2012); In re Jenkins, No. 12-50413, 2012 WL 2564901 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. July 2, 2012); Boyle v. Pizzuti
(In re Pizzuti), No. 10-12098 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June 13, 2012); In re Freibel, No. 11-00650, 2012 WL
1759327 (Bankr. D. Alaska May 15, 2012); Cloninger v. Cloninger (In re Cloninger), No. 11-83163, 2012
WL 2105912 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2012); In re Smith, 468 BR. 235 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2012) (Gregory
Smith); In re Kops, No. 11-41153, 2012 WL 438623 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2012); In re Boyette, No. 09-
04573, 2012 WL 259926 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2012); In re Lowe, No. 11-44416 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
July 13, 2011), ECF No. 31; In re Hernandez, No. 11-50218, 2011 WL 1541691 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Apr. 21,
2011); In re Ceniceros, No. 10-16363 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011), ECF Nos. 79, 90, aff'd sub nom.
Ceniceros v. Yaqub (In re Ceniceros), 2012 WL 2017969 (B.A.P. 9th Cir June 5, 2012); In re Blok, No. 11-
90753 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2011), ECF No. 53; In re Victoria, No. 10-42087, 2011 WL 2580106
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 22, 2011) (Victoria II); In re Piazza, 451 B.R. 608 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011), affd sub
nom. Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC, No. 11-62569, 2012 WL 1453571 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 26, 2012); In re Lew, No. 11-10346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 8; In re Adolph, 441
B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); In re Basler, No. 10-43471 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2011), ECF No. 72;
Bennett v. Bennett (In re Bennett), No. 09-44442, 2011 WL 160554 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2011);
In re Watson, No. 10-1292 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. Nov. 1, 2010), ECF No. 32; In re Riley, No. 09-10096
(Bankr. D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2010), ECF No. 140; Rice, Heitman & Davis, S.C. v. Sasse (In re Sasse), 438
B.R. 631 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2010); In re Killian, 422 B.R 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Palmer, 419
B.R. 762 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2009); In re Justice, 404 BR. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009); GMAC Mort-
gage, LLC v. Vanderford (In re Vanderford), No. 09-26325 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2009), ECF No. 99;
In re Lapke, No. 09-80317 (Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 8, 2009), ECF No. 76, affd sub nom. Lapke v. Mutual of
Omaha Bank (In re Lapke), 428 B.R. 839 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (Lapke II); In re Mirabile, No. 09-04687,
2009 WL 3710727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2009); Southwick Real Estate LLC v. Ades (In re Ades),
No. 08-86062, 2009 WL 6498520 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 2, 2009); In re Stewart, 410 B.R. 912 (Bankr. D.
Or. 2009); Long v. Smith (In re Smith), No. 09-30474 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2009) (Catherine Smith),
ECF No. 23; In re Yager, No. 08-14501 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009), ECF No. 21-1; In re Jones, No.
08-05676, 2009 WL 102442 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2009); In re Derek, No. 08-20432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
May 28, 2008), ECF No. 13-1; In re Tallman, 397 BR. 451 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008), rev'd sub nom.
Securities America, Inc. v. Tallman (In re Tallman), 417 B.R. 568 (N.D. Ind. 2009); In re Russo, No. 07-
17525, 2008 WL 5412106 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2008); In re Bowen, No. 07-34441 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
June 16, 2008), ECF No. 87; In re Curcio, 387 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2008); In re Marino, 388 B.R.
679 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 20, 2008); In re Kennedy, No. 07-82609 (Bankr. D. Neb. Apr. 8, 2008), ECF
No. 34; In re Lapke, No. 07-81140 (Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 31, 2008) (Lapke I), ECF No. 76; In re Ashraf,
367 B.R. 151 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); In re Curtner, No. 07-50289 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2007), ECF
No. 57; In re Edwards, No. 07-43398 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2007) (Catherine Edwards), ECF No. 23; In
re Reavis, No. 06-11721, 2007 WL 2219519 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. July 30, 2007); In re Freifeld, No. 06-
06361 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June 29, 2007), ECF No. 88; In re Victoria, No. 06-31225 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. June
27, 2007), ECF No. 70, affd sub nom. Victoria v. Greenville Hospital Corp. (In re Victoria), 389 B.R. 250
(M.D. Ala. 2008) ("Victoria I"); In re Jarrell, 364 BR. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); In re Sudderth, No. 06-
10660, 2007 WL 119141 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2007); In re Barajas, No. 06-10598, 2006 WL 3254483
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006); In re Bradley, No. 06-00959 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2006) (Jason
Bradley), ECF No. 30; In re Swope, No. 06-50636 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2006), ECF No. 41; In re
Fiarkoski, No. 06-10629 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 4, 2006), ECF No. 42. I did not include one case in which
the creditor mentioned § 707(b)(1) and (3) in its motion, but later said that it intended to refer to §706(b).
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small number of § 707(b) motions initiated by such parties in interest over
the past twelve years is striking. The drafters of the amended standing provi-
sions of § 707(b) undoubtedly assumed that chapter 7 trustees and creditors
would assist the United States trustees and bankruptcy administrators in
policing abusive filings (of which the drafters believed there were many) and
force these debtors out of chapter 7. These statistics can be interpreted in
one of two ways: (1) there are very few debtors who inappropriately access
chapter 7 whose dismissal is not already sought by the United States trustees
and bankruptcy administrators; or (2) there are very few parties in interest
who care enough to bring a § 707(b) motion.
B. RESULTS OF THE STUDY
I then examined the ninety-nine cases in the study to determine the statu-
tory bases of the motions filed by parties in interest, when, where, and by
whom the motions were filed, and how the court resolved the motions.
(1) What Was the Statutory Basis of the Motions?
Section 707(b)(1) permits dismissal or conversion of a chapter 7 case if
the court "finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions
of this chapter [7]."99 However, there are three different bases for asserting
abuse. First, §707(b)(2) creates a presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(1) if
the debtor has the means to pay a statutorily-specified portion of the debtor's
unsecured nonpriority debts (the so-called "means test").'" However, if the
"current monthly income"10 1 of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined,
multiplied by twelve, is not greater than the median family income of the
applicable state for a family of the same size (i.e., the debtor is not an above-
median income debtor), no one may seek dismissal under § 707(b)(1) based on
the presumption of abuse created by § 707(b)(2).10 2 This bar includes the
judge, the United States trustee, the bankruptcy administrator, and any other
party in interest.
In only thirty-three of the cases included in this study did the creditor
explicitly mention § 707(b)(2) as a basis for the motion.10 3 In eighteen of
those cases, the court concluded that the motion was improper either because
the debtor had below-median income,104 the motion was untimely, 05 the
See In re Snyder, No. 13-12719 (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 4, 2014), ECF No. 50. All further citations to these
cases in this paper are made by reference to the names of the debtors.
-11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016)
'0l1l U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
'or'Current monthly income" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A).
10211 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7).
'o3See Ades; Blok; Bennett; Richard Bradley; Burdett; Campbell; Ceniceros; Chovev; Curtner; Catherine
Edwards; Fiarkoski; Freifeld; Grillot; Gutierrez; Hernandez; Jenkins; Justice; Kops; Melcher; Nguyen; Owens;
Piazza; Reavis; Sasse; Tallman; Tone, Virani; Victoria II; Victoria I; Vorel; Watson; Watts; West.
'See Kops; Owens; Virani.
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debtor did not have primarily consumer debts,0 6 or the presumption of abuse
did not arise.107 In two additional cases, the creditor withdrew the mo-
tion,108 and in two other cases the parties settled prior to court resolution.109
The low number of cases in which a creditor sought dismissal under
§ 707(b)(2) is unsurprising for two reasons. First, the attorneys for above-
median consumer debtors who are more likely to be challenged under the
means test undoubtedly counsel their clients to file under chapter 13 to avoid
litigation and likely dismissal. Second, the United States trustees and bank-
ruptcy administrators are now statutorily required to file either a motion to
dismiss or convert under § 707(b) or a statement setting forth the reasons
they are declining to do so if they determine that an above-median consumer
debtor's case is presumptively abusive."10 As a result, creditors have little
need to involve themselves in this endeavor. In nine of the eleven cases
where parties other than the United States trustee or bankruptcy administra-
tor brought a motion based on the presumption of abuse under §707(b)(2)
and the claim was not barred, the court dismissed"' or the debtor volunta-
rily converted the case to chapter 13 to avoid being ordered to do so.112 In
two cases, the court declined to dismiss despite the existence of a presump-
tion of abuse.'"1
Second, if the presumption of abuse does not arise, a case may still be
dismissed under § 707(b)(1) if, as described in § 707(b)(3)(A), "the debtor
filed the petition in bad faith."" 4 Many of the ninety-nine motions in this
1osSee Sasse; Vorel.
0 6







19See Catherine Edwards; Freifeld.
"oSee 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2016).
"'See Burdett; Ceniceros; Nguyen; Toone; Victoria I; Victoria II. In Ceniceros, the record does not
disclose whether the court granted the motion on the basis of §707(b)(2) or § 707(b)(3). The creditors
sought dismissal on both grounds and the court granted their motion without stating its grounds for doing
so. The bankruptcy court in Victoria I did not specify the section of 707 pursuant to which it dismissed
the case, but the creditor argued for dismissal under § 707(b)(2). On appeal, the district court concluded
that it was not clear whether the debtor had primarily consumer debts because of new federal tax claims
that might be characterized as consumer or business, but the court affirmed the dismissal on the alternative
grounds of "bad faith" under § 707(b)(3). Because § 707(b)(3) is inapplicable unless the debtor has prima-
rily consumer debts, the district court must have intended to rely on § 707(a). Debtor's second case,
Victoria II, was also dismissed by the bankruptcy court based on § 707(bX2).
n
2
See Campbell; Justice; Melcher.
"'See Richard Bradley; Jenkins. In Richard Bradley, the court concluded that the debtor had shown
special circumstances to rebut the presumption. In Jenkins, the bankruptcy administrator had filed a state-
ment under 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2) that dismissal was not appropriate.
11411 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A).
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study alleged "bad faith.""5 However, none of the courts relied solely on bad
faith in granting the motion.
Third, as directed by § 707(b)(3)(B), a case may be dismissed under
§ 707(b)(1) if "the totality of the circumstances . .. of the debtor's financial
situation demonstrates abuse.""6 In nine cases in the study, the court con-
cluded that the debtor's case should be dismissed on this basis."17 The rea-
sons most often cited by courts were a lack of candor on the part of the
debtor, either in the debtor's schedules or at the meeting of creditors,"5 or
the debtor's ability to repay his or her debts under a chapter 13 plan."9 In
five of the nine cases, the court may have been influenced by the fact that the
debtor was a serial filer, having had at least one prior bankruptcy case dis-
missed within the recent past.120
(2) When Were the Motions Filed?
I looked at when the motions were filed to see if I could find a trend in
the timing of such motions. If there was a pent-up demand for the new
standing provision, perhaps there would be an explosion of creditor motions
to dismiss after BAPCPA became effective. In fact, more motions were filed
in 2011 and 2012 than in any other years, and the trend has been lower since
then, as the following chart demonstrates.121








2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
-707(b) Motions by Creditors
"'sSee, e.g., Adolph; Ajunwa; Barajas; Chovev; Curtner; Evatt; Grullon; Gutierrez; Hiller; Lew; Lusane;
Marino; Owens; Pagan; Palmer; Piazza; Tallman; Virani;
11611 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B).
117See Ashraf; Citta; Brenda Edwards; Hanson; Lapke I; Lapke II; Miller; Price; Watts.
"sSee Ashraf; Citta; Brenda Edwards; Miller; Price.
" 9See Hanson; Lapke I; Miller.
'20See Citta; Brenda Edwards; Lapke II; Miller; Price.
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
77122 110123 66124 110125 44126 113127
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
116128 110129 99130 55131 66132 gg333
These numbers are very small, and it is difficult to draw any conclusions
from the changes over time. I had expected that the number of § 707(b)
motions might rise and fall with the number of consumer (nonbusiness) bank-
ruptcy filings each year, but there is no strong correlation, as can be seen
when comparing the following chart with the previous one.'34












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
-Chapter 7 Consumer Cases
"'See Ashraf; Barajas; Jason Bradley; Fiarkoski; Jarrell; Sudderth; Swope.
1




See Derek; Jones; Kennedy; Marino; Russo; Stewart.
1
2'See Ades; Bennett; Bowen; Lapke II; Mirabile; Palmer; Riley; Catherine Smith; Vanderford; Yager.
'2See Adolph; Ceniceros; Sasse; Watson.
127See Ajunwa; Basler; Blok; Boyette; Freibel; Hernandez; Hiller; Kops; Lew; Lowe; Piazza; Pizzuti; Victo-
ria II.
12
sSee Bogart; Burdett; Casey, Citta; Cloninger; Brenda Edwards; Ellis; Hardigan; Harth; Jelinger; Jen-
kins; Lusane; McFadden; Owens; Rosales; Gregory Smith.
2
'See Richard Bradley; Campbell; Cherrett; Chovev; Evatt; Gandy; Martin; Miller Matthews; Wilcox.
'See Dini; Grullon; Gutierrez; Hanson; Phillips; Price- Vorel; Westbrook; Williams.




See Grillot; Norenberg; Takano; Toone- Watts; West.
'
53
See Melcher; Nowell; Strongs.
1 34
The data for this chart was obtained from Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts - Business and
Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period End-





Nonbusiness consumer bankruptcy filings peaked in 2009 and 2010, and
although some of the motions to dismiss filed in 2011 and 2012 related to
cases filed in 2009135 and 20 10,136 there were not enough of them to explain
the higher numbers of motions in those years. And the trend in nonbusiness
consumer bankruptcy filings has been consistently lower since 2010, unlike
the trend in the number of motions to dismiss filed by creditors.
(3) Where Were the Motions Filed?
I also looked at where these motions were filed to see if any pattern
would develop. Creditor motions were filed in almost every circuit, but far
more motions were filed in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits than in any other.
The number of cases in the study from each circuit is shown below:
D.C. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
22137 33138 110139 77140 117141 22142
6th 7th 8th 9th 10th T 11th
1l3143 7144 77145 111146 66147 113148
Had there been a correlation between the number of nonbusiness bank-
ruptcy filings in a circuit and the number of motions to dismiss filed by credi-
tors, the high number of motions filed in the Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits would be expected, because those circuits have consistently had the
three highest numbers of nonbusiness bankruptcy filings in the country dur-
ing the period of this study. However, there was a high number of motions
filed in the Fourth Circuit, which generally has fewer than half the number of





See Citta; Pizzuti Ceniceros; Victoria; Basler.
1'7See Bryant; Lusane;
'See Hiller; Pagan; Riley.
"'See Ajunwa; Beinhauer; Chovev; Derek; Grullon; Gutierrez; Hanson; Lew; Williams; Tager.
140See Casey; Citta; Jenkins; Russo; Toone; Vanderford; Vorel.
14'See Burdett; Bogart; Boyette; Jason Bradley; Campbell; Curtner; Ellis; Evatt; Jones; Marino; Matthews;
Nowell; Price; Strongs; Sudderth; Watson; Wilcox.
1 42See Jarrell; Martin.
"4'See Bowen; Brenda Edwards; Gandy; Hernandez; Jelinger; Lowe; McFadden; Melcher; Palmer; Cathe-
rine Smith; Gregory Smith; Swope; Westbrook.
14 4See Adolph; Blok; Dini; Killian; Sasse; Tallman; Watts.
14sSee Basler; Catherine Edwards; Justice; Kennedy; Lapke I; Lapke II; West.
146See Ashraf; Barajas; Bennett; Ceniceros; Cherrett; Freibel; Kops; Miller; Norenberg; Stewart; Takano.
" 7See Fiarkoski; Grillot; Harth; Nguyen; Reavis; Rosales.
"'See Ades; Richard Bradley; Cloninger; Curcio; Freifeld; Hardigan; Mirabile; Owens; Piazza; Pizzuti;
Virani; Victoria I; Victoria II.
'49The number of nonbusiness filings in each circuit every year is reported on Form F-2, supra note
134.
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Fifth Circuit has very few motions notwithstanding that its annual nonbusi-
ness bankruptcy filings exceed those of the First, Second, Third, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, all of which have more motions to dismiss, and far exceed
those of the D.C. Circuit, which has the same number of motions.
If the number of motions to dismiss is not tied to the absolute number of
nonbusiness consumer bankruptcy filings, I thought perhaps more creditor
motions might be filed in districts in which the bankruptcy bar files most
consumer bankruptcy cases under chapter 13 rather than chapter 7, because
in such districts the debtor who files for chapter 7 might be more of a target
for a motion to dismiss for abuse to force the debtor into the preferred chap-
ter 13, and the court might be more willing to grant such a motion. How-
ever, I found that this too was not the case.
Listed below are the districts in which creditors filed more than one mo-
tion to dismiss for abuse, the years in which those motions were filed, and the
percentage of all nonbusiness bankruptcy filings made under chapter 13 in
that district during the relevant year.150
District Year(s) Motion Made % Chapter 13
C.D. Cal. 2010;151 2013(2)152 23%; 19%
D.D.C. 2012;1s3 2015154 16%; 20%
M.D. Fla. 2007;'5s 2009;156 2011157 40%; 26%; 25%
N.D. Ga. 2009;158 2012(2);159 2015160 37%; 37%; 48%
N.D. Ill. 2007;161 2010;162 2014;163 37%; 24%; 38%; 45%
2016164 
_
D. Kansas 2006;165 2015;166 2016167 33%; 43%; 41%
E.D. Ky. 2011;168 2017169 26%; 30%
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D. Md. 2013;170 2014171 25%; 27%
D. Mass. 2009;172 2011,73 18%; 25%
E.D. Mich. 2011;'74 2012175 17%; 17%
D. Neb. 2007;176 2008;177 2009;178 30%; 30%; 27%; 29%
2011179
D.N.J. 2012;'80 2014;181 2016182 24%; 26%; 35%
E.D.N.Y. 2013;183 2014;184 2015185 10%; 14%; 20%
S.D.N.Y. 2011(2);186 2014(2)187 15%; 18%
W.D.N.Y. 2008;188 2009189 29%; 27%
E.D.N.C. 2006;'9 2008(2);191 2011;192 57%; 62%; 66%; 70%; 70%
2014;19 2017194
M.D.N.C. 2006;195 2007196 59%; 56%
N.D. Ohio 2006;197 2012(2);198 2014'9 33%; 18%; 18%
E.D. Tenn. 2009;200 2013201 37%; 45%
E.D. Va. 2012(3);202 2013203 32%; 39%
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Historically, the nineteen districts that have ever had more than fifty-five
percent of their consumer bankruptcy filings made under chapter 13 in any
year since 2006 are the District of Puerto Rico, the Eastern and Middle
Districts of North Carolina, the District of South Carolina, the Northern,
Eastern and Southern Districts of Texas, the Middle and Western Districts
of Tennessee, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Eastern and Western
Districts of Louisiana, the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi,
the Northern, Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama, and the Middle
and Southern Districts of Georgia.2 06
Only sixteen of the cases in this study were filed in these districts, one in
the District of Puerto Rico,207 Six in the Eastern District of North Caro-
lina,208 two in the Middle District of North Carolina,
209 one in the District
of South Carolina,2 10 one in the Northern District of Texas,
21' one in the
Southern District of Texas,2 1 2 one in the Middle District of Tennessee,
213
one in the Southern District of Georgia,2 14 one in the Northern District of
Alabama,215and one in the Middle District of Alabama.216 In eleven of those
cases, the courts denied the § 707(b) motions to dismiss2 17 and in two the
creditor withdrew the motions.218 In one, the court granted the motion to
dismiss under § 109(g) rather than under § 707(b).2 19 In only two of these
sixteen cases did the bankruptcy court grant the motion to dismiss under
§ 707(b).2 20 In one of the two dismissed cases, the appellate court concluded
that the bankruptcy court's reliance on § 707(b) was erroneous.221 Thus,
there is no pattern supporting the suggestion that there is a correlation be-
tween the prevalence of chapter 13 filings in a district and the likelihood that
20 5See Nowell.
2 06The percentages are based on data included in Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts - Business and
Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period End-




20aSee Boyette; Jason Bradley; Jones; Marino; Phillips; Strongs.





2 1 See Palmer.
14See Hardigan.
2 1 See Victoria II.
216See Victoria I.
217See Boyette; Jason Bradley; Evatt; Hardigan; Jarrell; Jones; Marino; Martin; Palmer Phillips; Sudderth.
In Marino the court dismissed the case under § 707(a).
"'See Curtner; Pagan.
2 9See Strongs.




a creditor will bring a motion to dismiss under § 707(b), let alone succeed on
such a motion.
So what does explain the disparity between circuits? There is no obvious
reason why some circuits have more creditor motions filed than others. It
may be that there are more aggressive creditor lawyers in those circuits (al-
though, as discussed in section 4, there is no single institutional creditor that
has generated multiple motions). It may be that debtor lawyers in some juris-
dictions are more likely to file cases under chapter 7 that should have been
directed to chapter 13. It may be totally random. There is nothing about the
motions themselves that explains the data.
(4) Who Were the Parties Filing the Motions?
A chapter 7 panel trustee filed the motion in only four of the cases in the
study.222 In one of those four cases, a creditor had also filed a motion to
dismiss.223 In the remaining ninety-five cases, a creditor filed the motion.
What type of creditor files these motions? I had expected to find that most
movant creditors would be institutional lenders, as they would presumably
be more sophisticated in their awareness of the new standing provisions of
§ 707(b). Although there were certainly some creditors in the study who fell
in that category,224 most did not. Some were corporations or other institu-
tions, but not the type that typically engage in credit transactions.225 Al-
most half of the creditors filing motions to dismiss were individuals rather
than banks or corporations.226 This suggests that many creditors who bring
these motions are personally invested in the outcome and do so for reasons
that are not purely financial in nature.
222See Beinhauer; Richard Bradley; Hanson; Strongs. In Strongs, a motion was filed both by the chapter
7 trustee and a creditor. The trustee in Strongs subsequently withdrew the motion under § 707(b) and
pursued dismissal under § 109(g).
223See Strongs.
224See Basler; Blok; Jason Bradley; Citta; Curtner Derek; Catherine Edwards; Ellis; Fiarkosli; Grillot;
Gutierrez; Hardigan; Hernandez; Jarrell; Killian; Lapke I; Lapke II; Martin; Melcher; Nguyen; Price; Gregory
Smith; Swope; Vanderford; Watts; Yager.
22See Ades (Southwick Real Estate LLC); Cherrett (Aspen Skiing Company); Brenda Edwards (Wex-
ford Parkhomes Condominium Association); Grullon (Mount Calvary Pentecostal Church); Gutierrez
(Catamount Holding Co. II); Jelinger (AFF Ohio, LLC); Jones (The Business Backer LLC); Justice (Ad-
vanced Control Solutions, Inc.); Lowe (Sheehan & Associates, PLC); Lusane (Arc Construction Services,
Inc.); Marino (McGill & Hampson, PA.); Norenberg (Elska, Inc.); Nowell (Dulles Motorcars, Inc.); Palmer
(1720 Entertainment LLC); Piazza (Neuterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC); Reavis (Quapaw Tribe
of Oklahoma); Russo (Pirola Pennuta Zei & Associates); Sasse (Rice, Heitman & Davis, S.D.); Strongs (Bio-
Medical Applications of North Carolina, Inc.); Sudderth (J.M. Smith Corporation); Tallman (Securities
America, Inc.); Victoria I (Greenville Hospital Corporation); Victoria II (Community Health Systems);
Watson (Stonewall Jackson Memorial Hospital).
226See Adolph; Ajunwa; Ashraf; Barajas; Bennett; Bogart; Bowen; Boyette; Bryant; Burdett; Campbell;
Casey; Ceniceros; Chovev; Cloninger; Curcio; Dini; Evatt; Freibel; Freifeld; Gandy; Harth; Hiller; Jenkins;
Kennedy; Kops; Lew; Matthews; McFadden; Miller; Mirabile; Owens; Pagan; Phillips; Pizzuti; Riley;
Rosales; Catherine Smith; Stewart; Takano; Toore, Virani; Vorel; West; Westbrook; Wilcox; Williams.
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Although it was not always possible to determine the source of the
debtor/creditor relationship based on the filings, in twelve cases the creditor
was a former business associate, employer or employee of the debtor, whose
relationship had soured before the bankruptcy filing.2 2 7 In six of the cases,
the moving creditor was the debtor's former spouse.228 In two others it was
the debtor's daughter,229 or a sister-in-law.230 In another it was the represen-
tative of the debtor's deceased father's estate, who was likely her brother.2
31
Six motions were filed by lawyers or law firms who were themselves credi-
tors of the debtor based on a past representation of the debtor in divorce or
other non-bankruptcy proceedings.232 In twenty-one cases, the motion was
filed by a party to a real estate transaction, such as a mortgagee, a buyer,
seller or builder of a home, or a landlord or condominium association.233 In
one instance, the debtor owed the creditor on a mobile home purchase.234 In
another, the debtor was the creditor's former investment advisor who had
improperly invested the creditor's funds.2 3 5 Five motions were filed by tort
claimants.236 In twenty-nine of the cases, the motion was filed by a judgment
creditor holding a large unsecured claim against debtor.237 In eighteen cases
(nineteen percent of the total), the creditor filed the motion pro se (two by a
law firm or a lawyer238 and another by a prisoner),239 but none of the pro se
motions were granted.240 In six cases, the creditors filed motions against a pro
se debtor. Two were granted241 and four were denied.242
(5) How Did the Bankruptcy Court Dispose of the Motions?
In the vast majority of cases studied, the court never reached a decision
on the merits of the § 707(b) challenge, although the courts sometimes dis-
227
See Adolph; Ashraf; Ceniceros; Cherrett; Dini; Killian; Nowell; Palmer; Reavis; Takano; Tallman;
Toone; Watson.
22 8













See Gandy; Lowe; Marino; Riley; Russo; Sasse.
2
"See Ades; Basler; Blok; Bogart; Cherrett; Brenda Edwards; Evatt; Grullon; Gutierrez; Harth; Jelinger;







See Ajunwa; Barajas; Chovev; Curcio; Reavis.
2
"See Adolph; Ajunwa; Burdett; Citta; Curtner; Ellis; Freibel; Gandy; Grullon; Harth; Jarrell; Justice;
Lusane; Miller; Nguyen; Norenberg; Owens; Pagan; Phillips; Piazza; Strongs; Swope; Tallman; Victoria I;






See Barajas; Bennett; Bryant; Cloninger; Harth; Jenkins; Lew; McFadden; Owens; Pizzuti; Rosales;




S42 ee Jarrell; Jenkins; Rosales; Sudderth.
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missed the case under §707(a)243 or § 109(g).2 44 In most cases, the movants
filed under circumstances precluded by rule or by statute. For example,
under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a motion to dismiss under
§ 707(b) "may be filed only within 60 days after the first date set for the
meeting of creditors under § 341(a)."2 45 Yet, in ten cases in the study, the
creditor motion was filed too late and was denied as untimely.246 In five
cases, the court denied the motion because the creditor did not properly
plead a cause for dismissal under § 707(b).2 47
Section 707(b) permits dismissal of a case filed by an individual debtor
"under this chapter," referring to chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Yet one
creditor attempted to file a § 707(b) motion in a chapter 13 case.248 And
§ 707(b) is applicable only if the debts of the debtor "are primarily consumer
debts."2 49 In twenty-five cases in the study, the motion was denied because
the court concluded that the debtor's debts were not "primarily consumer
debts."250 In two other cases, the original motion sought dismissal under
§ 707(a) or (b) and the court denied the motion under § 707(a) and ignored
§ 707(b), presumably because the debtor's response to the motion asserted
that his or her debts were not primarily consumer debts.2 51
Even when the debtor is an individual with primarily consumer debts
who files a case under chapter 7, if the "current monthly income"252 of the
debtor (or in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse) multiplied by
twelve is not greater than the median family income in the applicable state
for a family of the same size (i.e., the debtor is not an above-median debtor),
only the judge, United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator - not any
24





FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(e).
246
See Adolph; Bowen; Harth; Lusane; Nowell; Pizzuti; Russo; Sasse; Swope; Vorel.
247See Bryant; Cloninger; McFadden; Rosales; Catherine Smith.
248See Barajas.
24911 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).
250See Ades; Adolph; Ajunwa; Cherrett; Dini; Grillot; Grullon; Gutierrez; Hernandez; Hiller; Jelinger;
Jones; Martin; Matthews; Mirabile; Palmer; Phillips; Piazza; Reavis; Sudderth; Tallman; Takano; Virani;
West; Williams. In one case, the creditor moved to dismiss the case only under § 707(a), but the court
went out of its way to state that § 707(b) was not available because the debtor did not have primarily
consumer debts and then denied the motion under both provisions. See In re Baird, 456 B.R. 112 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2010); see also Sudderth (creditor invoked §707(b)(3) but expressly acknowledged that the
debtor had primarily business debts); cf. Watson (although motion asserted that presumption of abuse
arose, court dismissed under § 707(a), "assuming without deciding, that the Debtor's obligations are prima-
rily business debts").
215See Blok; Basler. In Marino, the creditor filed the motion only under § 707(b), but after the debtor
responded, saying that her debts were not primarily consumer debts, the creditor argued for dismissal
under § 707(a) (without amending its motion) and the court granted dismissal under § 707(a). That order
was subsequently vacated when the parties settled their dispute.
25 2-Current monthly income" is defined in 11 U.S.C. §101(10A).
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other party in interest - may bring a motion to dismiss under § 707(b).2 53 In
eleven cases, the motion to dismiss was denied because the debtor was a
below-median debtor and, therefore, the creditor did not have standing to
bring the motion pursuant to § 707(b)(6).2 54
Some properly-filed § 707(b) motions were never decided on the merits
for other reasons. In nine cases, the §707(b) motion was withdrawn255 or
never pursued after filing, 2 56 or the dispute settled before a judicial deci-
sion.2 57 In two cases, the judge decided the motion on another basis and did
not reach the §707(b) claim.258
The courts did reach the merits in thirty-nine of the ninety-nine cases in
this study.259 In only nineteen of those cases did the court dismiss or indicate
that it would grant the motion to dismiss unless the debtor converted the
case to one under chapter 13.260 It should be noted that in two of those cases
the motions had been filed by the panel trustee and the debtors had not
opposed the motions.261 In one case, the United States trustee had previ-
ously filed a motion to dismiss and the creditor filed a similar motion,262 and
in two others the same debtor filed a second chapter 7 case after the first one
had been dismissed on motion by the same creditor.263 The nineteen cases in
which motions to dismiss were granted were filed in fifteen different dis-
tricts,2 64 and were decided by eighteen different judges. The only two cases
decided by the same judge were filed by the same debtor, and the motion to
25311 U.S.C. § 707(b)(6).
254
See Ajunwa; Bryant; Cloninger- Curcio; Gandy, Hiller; Nowell; Owens; Sasse; Virani; Westbrook. In
one case, the court acknowledged that the creditor was not the proper party to bring the motion because
of §707(bX6), but decided "in light of [debtor's] history and present circumstance" to consider the motion
anyway. SeeJarrell. In another case, the debtor failed to raise the creditor's lack of standing, and the court
concluded that that the issue had been waived. See Miller.
2ssSee Chovev; Curtner; Fiarkoski; Pagan; Vanderford.
25
6See Lew.
21'See Derek; Catherine Edwards, Freifeld.
25 5
See Evatt; Strongs.
2S9See Ashraf; Beinhauer; Bennett; Bogart; Boyette; Jason Bradley; Richard Bradley; Burdett; Campbell;
Casey, Ceniceros; Citta; Brenda Edwards; Ellis; Freibel; Hanson; Hardigan; Jarrell; Jenkins; Justice; Kennedy,
Killian; Kops; Lapke I; Lapke II; Lowe; Melcher Miller; Nguyen; Norenberg; Price; Riley; Catherine Smith;
Stewart; Toone, Victoria I; Victoria II; Watts; Wilcox. In Hardigan, the U.S. trustee had also filed a motion
to dismiss for abuse, and the two motions were considered together.
2"See Ashraf; Beinhauer Burdett; Campbell; Ceniceros; Citta; Brenda Edwards; Hanson; Justice; Lapke




2 .See Lapke I.
263See Lapke II; Victoria II.
2"See Ashraf (D. Ariz.); Beinhauer and Hanson (E.D.N.Y.); Burdett (E.D. Va.); Campbell (D. Md.);
Citta and Toone (D.Nj.); Ceniceros and Miller (C.D. Cal.); Brenda Edwards (E.D. Mich.); justice (W.D.
Ark.); Lapke I and Lapke II (D. Neb.); Melcher (E.D. Ky.); Nguyen (D. Kan.); Price (D. Md.); Victoria I
(M.D. Ala.); Victoria II (N.D. Ala.); Watts (N.D. Ill.)
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dismiss was filed by the same creditor.265
There appears to be no discernable pattern in the disposition of the mo-
tions. The following chart shows the number of cases by year in which the
court granted or denied a motion to dismiss for abuse filed by a party in
interest (not the United States trustee or a bankruptcy administrator). The
years shown are based on the date of the bankruptcy court's opinion, not the
filing date of the motion. Only in 2016 did the court grant more motions
than it denied, but the numbers are so small as to be statistically insignificant.
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Granted 0 2266 1267 2 268 0 2269
Denied 4270 6271 7272 9273 3 274 8275
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Granted 2276 2277 0 3278 3279 2280
Denied 13281 10282 283 4284 2285 6286
c. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
Admittedly, my research did not include a nationwide search of all chap-
ter 7 consumer cases filed in the years of this study. It is difficult to reach
any definitive conclusions about § 707(b) motions filed by panel trustees and
creditors without a more exhaustive search, which would be extremely time
consuming because current electronic databases impose significant limitations.
Westlaw allows searches only of published decisions. With Bloomberg, I was
265See Lapke I; Lapke II.
2"See Ashraf; Victoria I.
26 7See Lapke I.
26'See justice; Lapke II.
"'See Ceniceros; Victoria II.
2
70
See Barajas; Jason Bradley; Fiarkoski; Swope.
27 1See Curtner; Catherine Edwards; Freifeld; Jarrell; Reavis; Sudderth.
171See Bowen; Curcio; Derek; Kennedy, Marino; Russo; Tallman.
27 3
See Ades; Jones; Killian; Mirabile-, Palmer; Catherine Smith; Stewart; Vanderford; Tager.
27
4See Riley; Sasse; Watson.
275
See Adolph; Basler, Bennett; Blok; Hernandez; Lew; Lowe; Piazza.276See Citta; Brenda Edwards.
177See Burdett; Campbell.
271See Hanson; Miller; Price.
279See Nguyen; Toone Watts.
2soSee Beinhauer; Melcher.
281See Ajunwa; Bogart; Boyette; Cloninger; Freibel; Hiller; Jenkins; Kops; Lusane, McFadden; Owens;
Pizzuti; Gregory Smith.
282
See Richard Bradley; Casey; Ellis; Evatt; Gandy; Hardigan Martin; Matthews; Rosales; Wilcox.
...See Cherrett; Grullon; Gutierrez; Harth; Jellinger; Vorel; Westbrook.
284
See Bryant; Dini; Virani; Williams.
21'See Chovev; Norenberg.
286See Grillot; Nowell; Pagan; Phillips; Takano; West.
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able to search complete dockets, but only through the date on which the
docket was last updated. Therefore, this source offered only limited data as
well. Presently there is no user-friendly way to search dockets on Pacer.
Confirmation of my results would require a researcher to look at all chap-
ter 7 dockets on Pacer for cases filed in a particular year, or by circuit or
district, to see if the patterns found in my limited sample hold up. My study
does, however, offer some interesting conclusions.
III. CONCLUSION
The most important lesson to be drawn from this study is that, contrary
to the expectations of those who proposed an expansion of standing, very few
private parties exercise this right. There are several explanations for their
reluctance. First, the United States trustee and bankruptcy administrator
are now obligated to monitor filings by above-median debtorS287 and file mo-
tions to dismiss or a statement as to why a motion is not appropriate.2 88
Creditors and panel trustees have little incentive to object to abusive chapter
7 filings when these officials are already carrying the water. Furthermore, the
cost-shifting provisions of § 707(b)(4)(A), which allow an award of costs (in-
cluding reasonable attorneys' fees) upon successful prosecution of a § 707(b)
motion, permit an award only to "the trustee," not to a creditor.289 Even
those awards are rarely made.290Private parties are likely to avoid incurring
the cost of pursuing a § 707(b) motion and will more likely rely on the
United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator to address the issue of
abuse.
Second, a private party would likely have to conduct discovery before
filing such a motion. A movant may only file a motion to dismiss if the
debtor has primarily consumer debts291 and above-median income.292 These
28711 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1XA) (Supp. IV 2016).
28811 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2).
28911 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(A) reads as follows:
(4)(A) The court, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party in interest, in
accordance with the procedures described in rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, may order the attorney for the debtor to reimburse the
trustee for all reasonable costs in prosecuting a motion filed under section 707(b),
including reasonable attorneys' fees, if -
(i) a trustee files a motion for dismissal or conversion under this subsection; and
(ii) the court -
(I) grants such motion; and
(II) finds that the action of the attorney for the debtor in filing a case under
this chapter violated rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
29There was only one instance in the studied cases in which the trustee successfully obtained costs
under § 707(bX4)(A). See Beinhauer In one other case, the trustee requested costs, but the court denied
the request. See Hanson.
m9 1See supra text accompanying notes 249-251.
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facts often cannot be determined simply by reviewing the petition. Thus, a
creditor may need to conduct preliminary examinations of the debtor293 just
to determine whether a motion would be well grounded. Failure to do so
might expose the creditor to sanctions.294 Discovery takes time and costs
money, which creditors may be unwilling to invest.
Third, the time constraints imposed by Fed. R. Bank. P. 1017(e) give a
creditor very little time to file a § 707(b) motion.295 None of the other Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions under which a party in interest may file a motion to
dismiss or convert296 is subject to a time limit on when it may be filed. The
time limit is not in the text of § 707(b), but was included in the rule when it
was amended in 1991 to reflect the 1986 amendments to § 707(b).297 The
drafters noted that "the facts that are the basis for a motion to dismiss under
§ 707(b) exist at the time the case is commenced and usually can be discov-
ered early in the case by reviewing the debtor's schedules and examining the
debtor at the meeting of creditors."298 Because dismissal under § 707(b) "has
the effect of denying the debtor a discharge in the chapter 7 case based on
matters which may be discovered early," the drafters characterized the
§707(b) motion as "analogous" to an objection to discharge and imposed the
same time limit on both under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017(e) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4004(a).299 The time period is subject to extension, but only "on request
filed before the time has expired" and only "for cause."300
Fourth, although courts have not yet used the power conferred on them
to sanction parties in interest for filing motions to dismiss under
§ 707(b)(5)(A),3 0 no lawyer for a creditor is likely to risk such a penalty in a
29 2
See supra text accompanying notes 252-254.
29 3
Debtors frequently report that they are below-median debtors when they are not, or have primarily
business debts when they do not. This may be due to misunderstanding the meaning of these terms rather
than an intentional misrepresentation. Some more accurate information may be elicited at the meeting of
creditors under § 341, but creditors may be forced to conduct an examination of the debtor under Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 2004 to obtain more information.
29411 U.S.C. § 707(bX5)(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
29 5
See supra text accompanying note 245.
2 9
6Motions to dismiss may be filed by a party in interest under §§707(a), 1112(b), 1307(b), and
1307(e). Motions to convert may be filed by a party in interest under §§706(b), 707(b), 1112(b), 1307(c),
and 1307(d).
297
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7015 advisory committee's note to 1981 amendment
298Id.
2 "FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a) provides:
(a) Time for filing complaint objecting to discharge; notice of time fixed. In a chap-
ter 7 liquidation case a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge under § 727(a)
of the code shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the
meeting of creditors under § 341(a). . ..
"See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(e)(1).
"o'Section 707(b)(5XA) allows
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marginal case, especially as a prerequisite for an award of costs under that
provision is a finding that the attorney acted improperly.
Finally, although Congress removed the sentence in §707(b) that created
a presumption that a chapter 7 debtor should be allowed the relief sought in
that chapter, courts continue to evidence a firm allegiance to the notion that
debtors are entitled to seek a chapter 7 discharge except in the most egre-
gious circumstances.
A second lesson to be learned from this study is that, if a creditor does
intend to file a motion to dismiss for abuse under § 707(b), that creditor
should do so with the assistance of counsel. Even if the creditor is a lawyer
or a law firm, the creditor should retain bankruptcy counsel to represent its
interests. Not a single party in interest who filed a motion to dismiss for
abuse on a pro se basis obtained the desired dismissal of the debtor's case.302
Third, private parties who have availed themselves of the opportunity to
seek dismissal for abuse are probably not the parties Congress intended or
expected to be champions of the integrity of the chapter 7 bankruptcy sys-
tem. Most of them are disgruntled individuals who are former business asso-
ciates or who have had personal or family relationships with the debtor, who
are probably taking every opportunity to make life difficult for someone who
has "done them wrong."3 03 These individuals could best be described as the
the court, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party in interest, . . . [to]
award a debtor all reasonable costs including reasonable attorneys' fees) in con-
testing a motion filed by a party in interest (other than a trustee or United States
trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any)) under this subsection if-
(i) the court does not grant the motion; and
(ii) the court finds that -
(I) the position of the party that filed the motion violated rule 9011 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; or
(II) the attorney (if any) who filed the motion did not comply with the re-
quirements of clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (4)(c), and the motion was made
solely for the purpose of coercing a debtor into waiving a right guaranteed to
the debtor under this title.
Id. Clauses (i) and (ii) of §707(bX4)(c) provide that the signature on a written motion, among other
pleadings, constitutes a certification that the attorney has
(i) performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to the
... written motion; and
(ii) determined that the . . . written motion -
(I) is well grounded in fact; and
(II) is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law and does not constitute an abuse under
paragraph (1).
Id. In only three cases in the study did the debtor seek sanctions under § 707(b)(5)(A) after prevailing on
the motions to dismiss, and the court denied the motion in all three cases. See Harth; Pizutti; Gregory
Smith.
302See supra text accompanying notes 238-240.
m3 See supra text accompanying notes 227-237.
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"Ex Factor." A realistic, less subjective, analysis of the debtor's financial posi-
tion would probably lead more sophisticated creditors to the conclusion that
a dismissal of the debtor's chapter 7 case or conversion to a chapter 13 case
would not likely result in an increased return on their debts.
Finally, private parties in interest have filed motions to dismiss under
§ 707(b) in every circuit and before many different judges in different dis-
tricts in every year since the effective date of BAPCPA. To some extent,
the number of motions to dismiss has risen or fallen along with the number of
nonbusiness bankruptcy filings, but that correlation is not strong.304 For the
most part, however, circuits with a higher volume of nonbusiness chapter 7
filings saw more motions to dismiss and those with a lower volume saw
fewer such motions.305 But there is no obvious correlation between the per-
centage of nonbusiness bankruptcy cases filed under chapter 13 in a particular
district and the likelihood that a private party would file a motion to dismiss
a chapter 7 case as abusive in that district.3o6 Nor is there any evidence in
the cases studied that there are any bankruptcy judges who have shown a
particular predilection for granting motions to dismiss for abuse.307
In summary, no one looking at the data in this study could reach the
conclusion that the expansion of standing to bring motions under §707(b) has
had a significant impact on chapter 7 practice. However dramatic the
changes wrought by the means-testing provisions of § 707(b)(2) in combat-
ting perceived abuse, the evidence shows that the expansion of standing to
private parties in the 2005 amendments to § 707(b)(1) has proven almost
completely ineffective as a means for pushing consumer debtors out of chap-
ter 7. The verdict is in: creditors don't care.
304
See supra text accompanying notes 121-136.
30 5
See supra text accompanying notes 137-149.
"See supra text accompanying notes 150-221.
37See supra text accompanying notes 264-265.
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